After recent meetings with American and European officials, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan remains committed to steering his country closer to the West.  But in a neighbourhood of authoritarian strongmen, the Armenian leader is increasingly isolated and exposed as the sole democratic statesman left standing in the region.  And with expectations of a resurgent Russia, an adamant Azerbaijan and a troubled Turkey, Armenia’s Westward pivot is likely to face mounting challenges and meagre choices.

Pashinyan has only accelerated his desire to steer Armenia much closer to the West.  Pursuing a policy to simultaneously distance the country from Russia, Pashinyan’s accelerated “pivot to the West” strategy also gained fresh momentum in February, with three key visits, to Washington, Paris and Munich.   

This three-pronged Westward drive opened with a four-day visit to Washington in early February, with the Armenian leader meeting with the US Vice President JD Vance in the White House, conferring with several members of Congress and addressing Washington-based think-tanks. The Washington visit was followed days later by a visit to Paris to meet with French President Emmanuel Macron, a strong supporter of Armenia.  

This second leg of Pashinyan’s strategy also revealed the Armenian emphasis on deepening ties with Europe on two levels: institutional linkage with the EU itself, while also focusing on relations with individual EU member states.

The Armenian leader’s third visit this month, to the Munich Security Conference, also highlighted Armenia’s reassertion of a bolder and more independent foreign policy, especially after years of submission and subordination to Russia.  This was evident in Pashinyan’s courting of several EU leaders in Munich, which was only bolstered by a fresh pro-EU display back home in Armenia.

Armenian parliament’s EU aspirations

Beyond the prime minister’s February meetings in the West, domestic developments in Armenia only strengthened this pivot to the West. After a public campaign last year by pro-Western and pro-government groups advocating EU membership, the Armenian parliament adopted a bill in January heralding the “start of a process of Armenia’s accession to the European Union”.

Although the move by parliament espousing Armenia’s EU aspirations was not a surprise given the dramatic shift in public opinion in the country, the Armenian government is both more cautious and more realistic.

Despite the Armenian government’s pursuit of a more assertive strategy to “diversify” its security and foreign policy away from any reliance on Russia, there is still a pronounced degree of prudence and caution, driven by a more realistic assessment of Armenia’s options. The necessity for this Armenian caution in a more prudent policy stems from three factors. 

Recognising Russia’s economic leverage

The first consideration that tends to temper Armenian aspirations is rooted less in security or foreign policy, but rather, in the significance of Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia. In this context, for much of 2024, it was Russia that accounted for over 41% of Armenian foreign trade. And compared to the 7.5% share of trade with the EU for the same period, Armenian trade remains dominated by Russia, which was firmly the leading trading partner, with the bilateral Armenian-Russian trade volume surpassing $3bn in 2023. Beyond the trade statistics, for the average Armenian consumer, it is the subsidised price of Armenian imports of Russian natural gas that exerts the greatest leverage of economic dependence on Russia. 

This economic aspect of Russian leverage has only been matched by Armenian membership in the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), which serves as an inherent impediment to Armenia’s economic and trade potential with the EU. In fact, Armenia’s membership in that Eurasian trade bloc actually precludes any Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU and legally prevents Armenian EU membership. 

For all these reasons, the Pashinyan government feels appropriately cautious and carefully navigates its resistance of the gravitational pull from the Russian economic orbit.

Mounting challenges and meagre choices

The second factor limiting Armenia’s room to manoeuvre centres on its relations with Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Its geographic isolation in the South Caucasus, a region that has long served as an arena for confrontation for much larger powers, has left Armenia cut off from the West. Moreover, the simmering instability along Armenia’s borders has now become multiplied and magnified.

In this immediate neighbourhood, Armenia continues to be challenged by an unwelcoming and unrewarding geography. To the east, Armenia borders a recalcitrant Azerbaijan eager to sustain conflict with Armenia and still refusing to prioritise diplomacy over force of arms.  Looking westward, Turkey remains a neighbour reluctant to “normalise” relations with Armenia and whose military and diplomatic support for Azerbaijan has only impeded post-war stability.  

Such an east-west axis of instability is further exacerbated by developments to the North and South.  Armenia’s southern neighbour, Iran, is a particularly daunting partner, whose own isolation and destabilising interests have imposed severe limits on potential trade and cooperation. And to the north, recent developments in Georgia have greatly worried Armenia. Pursuing a pronounced policy of accommodating Russia while defying its own population, the Georgian leadership has contributed to an abrupt geopolitical recalculation.  

This Georgian shift to an embrace of Russia and disdain for the West removes an important buffer for Armenia, which has no border with Russia. After several years of literally hiding behind Georgia, benefitting from the dividends from Georgian aspirations to join both the EU and the Nato alliance, Armenia is now becoming much more exposed in its pivot to the West. 

Last man standing

Against that backdrop of the difficult geography of its immediate neighbourhood, Armenia faces an even more serious from a third trend, driven by a broader global realignment that started in Washington. This trend, marked by a sudden reversal of US foreign policy, poses an immediate danger for Armenia, as Washington is moving swiftly to embrace Moscow and encourage authoritarian power. This is now increasingly evident in the Trump Administration’s aggressive turn against Ukraine. The danger for Armenia stems from its vulnerability as the sole remaining democracy in the South Caucasus.

And for Pashinyan, as a possible “sole survivor”, he is quickly becoming cursed as the “last man standing” in a region bereft of partners and beset by the proximity of authoritarian powers led by a resurgent Russia. 

Richard Giragosian is the director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think-tank in Armenia.