First, as I have previously argued on this blog, I think ideally Xi would want to call an end to the war in Ukraine. It may initially have served a purpose for China, but I think China now sees a real prospect of a catastrophic defeat for Russia.
Romania’s fiscal policy continues to consolidate and borrowing needs are at a record high due to the heavy maturity calendar. However, net issuance of ROMGBs is almost the same as last year. Romania is the region's leader with 44% of planned bonds.
Russian GDP contracted by 2.1% last year. For the current year, we expect an economic decline of similar magnitude.
There seem to be two kinds of Russian political figure: the quiet and the noisy. We tend to focus on the noisy ones for obvious reasons, but it is the quiet ones who tend to matter, and the case of Evgeny Prigozhin illustrates this perfectly.
Though some changes in the poll formats hint at New Kazakhstan, the president’s words are ominously reminiscent of Old Kazakhstan.
Since communism collapsed and Georgia achieved independence, we have only too often witnessed an ambivalence about the country's future direction among its ruling elites.
Vienna is giving the impression that it is struggling to decouple its interests from Russia, if not actively avoiding doing so.
Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic ties on March 10, bringing an end to seven years of conflict between the two nations in a deal brokered by China that is expected to have wide-ranging consequences.
Kremlin nevertheless bristled at top diplomat’s arrival, saying “there is no place for the democratisation experiments of Washington”.
Like the National Bank of Poland, we expect a big drop in CPI inflation by the end of 2023 (see table), but we see a lot of risks hindering inflation from reaching the target in subsequent years. There is little chance for rate cuts this year.
One year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended agricultural commodity markets, food prices remain elevated even after retreating from their record highs in early 2022.
Capital Economics thinks that Czech GDP may fall slightly further over the first half of this year and expects only a slow recovery in the second half.
"In a context of deep regional instability, the situation of the "frozen conflicts" is vulnerable to Russia's military presence and the unpredictability of its geostrategic actions..." w
After a dozen meetings between its half-dozen constituents, the Nation’s Alliance failed to reach a unanimous selection of a presidential candidate to challenge Erdogan in May’s national ballot.
In 1986, I wrote a thesis on Soviet decision-making behind military interventions in Eastern Europe as well as American responses to them. Tragically, this topic is still relevant today.
Within the ranks of the foreign fighters participating on Ukraine’s side, other movements are being born that may challenge the power of Russia’s allies in their own realms soon.
One year on from Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, and it’s pretty clear that Russia has already lost so much on so many fronts because of Putin’s idiotic choices.
Gripes over power exports, railway contracts and Afghan warplanes seized by Tashkent cause friction.
By the end of 2Q22, the common belief was that the Russian economy was already hurtling towards disaster, buckling under the weight of sanctions. But it didn't happen. A lot of damage has been done to the economy, but what went right?
In Russia’s domestic politics, the year 2023 will be marked by the presidential election campaign. While it formally starts in December, it has already begun informally.