Fresh clashes south of Damascus between local Druze and government forces suggest the community may be laying groundwork for a semi-autonomous or fully independent non-Islamic statelet before Damascus manages to create a new government. Amid clashes in Jaramana and Israeli military positioning, the latest movements since the fall of the Assad regime in the area earlier in December could spell the first post-war challenge for the Turkish-backed regime in Damascus, which has so far attempted to avoid the topic of Israeli encroachment in its territory.

The Arab Druze, roughly 3% of Syria's population, have historically balanced loyalty to local powers with a commitment to self-preservation. The fall of Assad's regime in December 2024 created both opportunity and uncertainty, particularly for those in southern Syria. Now, with Israel vowing to "protect" them and reports of Druze militias clashing with Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces, a new political entity could emerge under Israel's influence.

Regional social media channels and groups have flagged the movements with updated media posts highlighting this quickly unfolding narrative. One user speculated that Israel aims to secure the Druze and Kurds by creating "a contiguous buffer state" against "neo-Ottoman-backed Jihadists." Another noted the raising of the Druze flag at a local airport south of Damascus, interpreting it as a declaration of independence from Syria's new Islamist-leaning government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (nomme de guerre being Abu Mohammad al-Golani; i.e from the Golan).

Damascus, though, is starting to become alert, with the government-owned SANA reporting Syrian security forces have begun deploying inside the city of Jaramana, a Damascus suburb, following the refusal of alleged suspects in a Defence Ministry employee's assassination to surrender themselves, state media reported on March 2. Colonel Hussam Tahan, Director of Security for Damascus Countryside Governorate, told SANA news agency that the operation aims to arrest those involved in the killing of Ahmed Al-Khatib, who worked for the Ministry of Defence.

"Our forces have begun deploying inside the city of Jaramana... We will work to arrest them and bring them to fair justice," Tahan said. According to the official, the suspects [the Druze] rejected all mediation attempts and agreements. "We have confirmed that no Syrian geographical area will remain outside the control of state institutions, and we have witnessed great cooperation from the people of Jaramana in this regard," he added.

These developments align with Netanyahu's recent directives to the IDF to "prepare to defend" the Druze in Jaramana, where clashes on March 1, 2025, resulted in casualties. Israel's insistence on demilitarising southern Syria – encompassing Quneitra, Daraa and Suwayda provinces – signals a desire to neutralise threats along its border.

For the Druze, this represents both risk and opportunity. In Suwayda, their traditional stronghold, leaders have moved between negotiating with Damascus and asserting autonomy. Forming a Suweida Military Council and local militias like the Jaramana Shield brigade demonstrates their readiness to defend their interests from the Muslim government.

Yet not all Druze welcome Israel's support. Some fear becoming pawns in a broader Israeli agenda of regional domination, risking accusations of separatism from other Syrians. The community's historical wariness of foreign interference and memories of broken promises fuel this ambivalence.

The feasibility of a Druze statelet depends on several factors. The region south of Damascus is strategically vital, abutting the already Israeli occupied Golan Heights and overlooking key routes to the capital.

Israel's recent occupation of the UN buffer zone and Mount Hermon provides a military foothold. Politically, however, the plan faces challenges. Syria's new rulers have condemned Israel's actions as violations of sovereignty but have done nothing to stop them, probably at the advice of Ankara and Qatar, their two biggest backers.

Public opinion remains divided. Some observers praise the move as a pragmatic bulwark against radical Islamism, suggesting an autonomous Druze region could stabilise the area. Others warn of potential consequences, arguing that further fragmenting Syria could embolden other minorities and deepen regional instability. As one social X media post noted, the Druze themselves face internal divisions: while some in Hader have expressed pro-Israel leanings, others in Suwayda reject foreign involvement entirely.

The implications extend beyond Syria. A Druze statelet could reshape Israel's northern frontier but risks inflaming tensions with Turkey, Iran and Russia, while testing the Druze community's ability to forge a unified identity amid external pressures and internal divisions. For Western powers, already concerned about Israel's unilateral actions, this could further strain diplomatic relations.