With the inauguration of US President Donald Trump, there has been a flurry of speculation over the possible trajectory of US foreign policy in this second Trump term.  Much of this predictive analysis has focused on either the serious implications for US policy toward Russia and Ukraine or the sensational comments regarding Greenland and Canada. But with a flurry of moves, the first weeks of Donald Trump's second presidential term have been marked by a dangerous combination of disruption and uncertainty. 

And the real momentum is not driven by the Trump Administration’s preference for “disruption”, it is the volatility in Washington that has abruptly triggered a wave of uncertainty. Amid this upheaval in Washington, the three countries of the South Caucasus — Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia — hold wildly different expectations and have dramatically divergent strategies to deal with the incoming Trump Administration.

This degree of disruption was most evident in President Trump’s surprise decision on January 20 imposing a sweeping freeze of US foreign assistance. For each of the three countries in the South Caucasus, this introduced a sudden halt to a number of aid projects and assistance programmes.

While the impact was less for Azerbaijan, which has already banned the US Agency for International Development (USAID) from working in the country, both Georgia and Armenia were victims of the move. The impact was especially profound, weakening an already hobbled civil society in Georgia and curtailing several programmes in Armenia, including much needed aid for Armenians forcibly displaced from their homes in Nagorno Karabakh.

Nevertheless, the dramatic cutoff in US assistance and funding to the region has only reinforced a notable pre-existing trend of Azerbaijan and Georgia favouring relations with Russia over any aspirations for deeper relations with the West. For these two authoritarian countries, neither the EU nor the US is seen as an attractive partner. With expectations of a Trump Administration that will elevate transactional "deals" over any values-based policies, Tbilisi and Baku are only encouraged to pursue relations with Moscow.  Moreover, the likely Georgian and Azerbaijani strategic embrace of Russia will also be seen as incurring little liability and no negative response by the Trump Administration. Against that backdrop, Armenia, the sole struggling democracy in the South Caucasus, remains as isolated and vulnerable as ever.  

For Armenia, there are few direct implications, especially as Armenia’s political influence in Washington has long rested in the Congress, not the White House, and that bipartisan power remains unchanged and unchallenged.  Nevertheless, the indirect impact on Armenia is likely to be profound, stemming from the “spillover” from changes in US policy toward Russia, Turkey and Iran.

Another reason driving Armenia’s lack of concern over a Trump presidency was confidence in the signing of a new “strategic partnership” with the United States. Signed on January 14, the new charter was timed to enter into force prior to the inauguration of Trump’s second term.  Although coordinated with incoming Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the signing was specifically designed to provide Armenia with a foundation for deeper relations with Washington that would define the Trump Administration’s policy toward Armenia while preempting any radical shift or retreat from American support.

For the two other countries of the South Caucasus, Trump’s victory was a welcome relief from US policy preferences and priorities for democracy and human rights. This is most evident in the gleeful reaction from authoritarian Azerbaijan, particularly as it remains intent on maintaining its latest wave of repression directed against the opposition, independent media and civil society.  

Georgia’s relief at Trump’s election

And for Georgia, the Trump reelection is perceived in Tbilisi as a validation of the Georgian government’s defiance of its own population in seeking accommodation of Russia and reversing traditional Georgian aspirations of joining the EU and Nato. The Georgian government’s relief at Trump’s election is also due to expectations in Tbilisi that the recent period of punitive measures and punishment from Washington has passed.

In fact, under the Biden Administration, Georgia’s long-standing strategic partnership agreement with the US was invalidated following a flawed election that sparked a serious and violent crackdown by the Georgian government.

But it is Armenia where developments in Georgia have more direct and threatening repercussions. More specifically, now that the Georgian government has only accelerated its move away from Europe and closer to Russia, Armenia is faced with a new challenge. For the Armenian government, Georgia’s turn against the West is a move that only promotes Armenia’s position in the region as the only democracy. Yet the Armenian government is wary, seeing developments in an increasingly pro-Russian Georgia as a threat to Armenia, risking a more isolated Armenia standing alone with the West and prone to provoking a more vengeful Russia.

The crisis in Georgia has also resulted in a Western shift of focus, with rewards for Armenia. The EU’s policy response to developments in Georgia has already led to a more engaged and focused EU view of Armenia. This is most clearly demonstrated by two significant trends: the unprecedented deployment (and recent two-year extension) of an EU civilian monitoring mission to Armenia and, second, the first-ever crafting of new EU security assistance to Armenia.  

Both of these developments are further significant as pioneering efforts of engagement with a country like Armenia, which is still host to a Russian military base and a member of both the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).  

Thus, as the EU moves to punish Georgia’s flagrant disregard for democracy and retreat from democracy, the EU is expected to only increase its engagement in Armenia, focusing on efforts to reward Armenia’s hard-won gains in democratisation and to bolster resilience to preempt and prevent any possible regress.

An emboldened Azerbaijan

But Trump’s re-election was most welcome in Azerbaijan.  Reflecting a near euphoria over dealing with a drastically new US foreign policy, Azerbaijan’s autocratic leader, President Ilham Aliyev, seemingly feels emboldened to continue with his concerted crackdown on civil society and persecution of both dissent and independent media.

As Azerbaijan has little expectation of response from the new Trump Administration, there is a risk of yet another escalation and round of military assaults by Azerbaijan against southern Armenia. This is largely due to the fact that Azerbaijan is empowered by its recent military victory and remains encouraged by its perception of Turkish support, Israeli backing and the lack of any Western leverage over Azerbaijan.

Against that backdrop, there is still no deterrence and little real incentive for Azerbaijan to stop now. Rather, there is a demonstrable danger that Azerbaijan will only continue to rely on military force, going beyond its conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and moving against Armenia proper. The only realistic path forward for the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan is through Western facilitation. Such external engagement is crucial because Azerbaijan continues to pressure Armenia, maintains a maximalist position and is confrontational in its position to reject diplomacy.  

The dangerous “day after”

Another challenge stems from the weakness of post-war diplomacy between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is due to the fact that there is no international guarantor of the peace treaty, which means that there is no real guarantee that Azerbaijan will implement the terms of the peace treaty or that Baku will stick to the terms of any such peace treaty. Just as there is nothing to deter Azerbaijan from using force against Armenia, there is also no pressure and no price for Azerbaijan if it fails to uphold the peace treaty.

And this reveals that the obstacle is from the “day after” the signing of any peace deal. There is little likelihood that Azerbaijan will stop or be satisfied with the treaty and instead will continue to demand more from Armenia. In that context, Azerbaijan remains the most significant threat to regional security and stability.

Despite everything else, there is a rare opportunity for a return to regional cooperation, however, with the post-war geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus offering a degree of promise over peril. More specifically, this opportunity for regional cooperation stems from the outlook for the restoration of regional trade and transport. And for Armenia, regional stability now depends on restoring deterrence, promoting economic and trade interdependence to prevent continued hostilities.

Richard Giragosian is the director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia.