In the 50 days since Donald Trump’s inauguration for his second term as US president, there have been some clear winners. Russian President Vladimir Putin is no doubt delighted not just at Trump’s withdrawal of support for Ukraine and verbal lashing of its President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, but more broadly at the upending of the international order and the US’ rupture of ties with its traditional allies. 

Elsewhere in Emerging Europe, certain right-wing leaders have also fared well. Having refused to endorse a joint EU statement on continued support for Ukraine at a March 6 summit, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban announced that Budapest is in talks on an economic cooperation package with the new US administration.

There has been rhetorical backing for other politicians in the region. Billionaire Trump backer and head of the newly created US Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) Elon Musk has fervently voiced support on social media for far-right, pro-Russian Romanian politician Calin Georgescu, who was recently barred from running in the May presidential election. 

In Poland, Musk insulted Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, calling him a “small man” in a dispute over Ukraine’s use of the Starlink satellite system, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio piling on in comments warmly greeted by Sikorski’s political opponents in the former ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party. 

Yet not all nationalist leaders in Emerging Europe who might have anticipated favourable treatment from the new US administration have seen their expectations fulfilled.

In Bosnia & Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik, president of the country’s Serb entity, Republika Srpska, has escalated his push for secession after being sentenced by a Bosnian court for defying the international community’s high representative. His party, Republika Srpska’s ruling SNSD, responded by passing laws banning Bosnian state bodies including the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, the Prosecutor's Office and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) from operating in the Serb entity. 

Before Trump’s return to power, speculation was rife that his presidency would embolden Serb nationalists, as he was seen in the region as sympathetic towards both Russia and Serbia. That, as argued in a 2024 paper from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), threatened to embolden Dodik in his dealings with the Bosnian central government as well as the Serbian government in its dealings with Kosovo. 

Dodik appears to have been doing all he can to make a good impression on Trump. He donned a red MAGA cap to celebrate the returning Republican candidate's election victory at a cocktail reception in Banja Luka. A few weeks into Trump’s presidency, the Bosnian Serb politician penned a glowing tribute on X titled “Donald Trump – A Leader Who Brings Peace and Stability to the World”. 

However, if Dodik had counted on US backing for Republika Srpska’s secession from Bosnia and eventual union with Serbia, he has been left disappointed; nor has he been successful in persuading the US to lift its sanctions on him. In fact, while Dodik was hosting a party in honour of Trump’s election victory, the US Department of Treasury imposed a fresh package of sanctions against his associates. 

Overall, Washington’s response to Dodik’s actions has been critical rather than supportive, with Rubio calling out Dodik for “dangerous and destabilising behaviour”, and showing no sign of backing his push for secession. 

“The actions of Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik are undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutions and threatening its security and stability. Our nation encourages political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to engage in constructive and responsible dialogue. We call on our partners in the region to join us in pushing back against this dangerous and destabilising behaviour,” Rubio wrote on X as the situation worsened in Bosnia.

The US embassy reinforced this stance, condemning Republika Srpska’s adoption of “anti-constitutional and anti-Dayton laws”. "Let us be clear – this is a deliberate provocation to Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitutional order and poses a direct threat to its stability and security, as well as to US strategic objectives,” the embassy said. 

"War party" vs "peace party"

Like Dodik, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has sought to cultivate closer ties with the Trump administration. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze expressed his support for Trump, wishing him “endurance and courage” after the February 28 White House confrontation between Trump, Vice President J D Vance and Ukrainian President Zelenskiy. Kobakhidze framed the dispute as a contest between what he dubbed the “war party”, represented by Zelenskiy and his supporters, and the “peace party”, led by Trump.

The Georgian prime minister has also sought to frame the ongoing standoff between his government and anti-government protesters as a battle between pro-Trump forces and a “collective” opposed to the Trump administration’s peace initiatives in Ukraine. His opponents want a re-run of the October 2024 general election that is widely considered to have been rigged in Georgian Dream’s favour, and for the government to resume EU accession negotiations. 

The Georgian government is increasingly in conflict with the EU, and has demonstrated its ideological closeness with Trump’s America, for example by adopting changes to the Law on Gender Equality that eliminated the legal definition of “gender”, shortly after the US’ executive order 14168 titled "Defending Women from Gender Ideology”. Gender issues are a popular theme for right-wingers across Emerging Europe as well as in the US. 

Despite these overtures, however, there has been little indication of reciprocation from Washington. Rather than Kobakhidze or Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, it was former president Salome Zourabichvili – a vocal critic of the ruling party and a supporter of the anti-government protests – who received an invitation to Trump’s inauguration.

Meanwhile, the US Senate is preparing to consider the MEGOBARI Act, a bipartisan bill that proposes sanctions against Georgian Dream officials for alleged human rights violations and democratic backsliding. The act mandates US government agencies to report to Congress on Russian intelligence operations and sanctions evasion in Georgia.

Uneven treatment 

One theory for the uneven treatment of Emerging European leaders by the Trump administration is that while Trump seeks to secure a foreign policy victory by ending the Ukraine war, the burning international issue of the last three years, conflicts in smaller countries such as Bosnia and Georgia are simply not high on his agenda.

Another persistent hypothesis – backed up by his abrupt withdrawal of support for Ukraine and attack on Zelenskiy in the White House – is that Trump’s policies align with Russian interests, reviving long-standing speculation about his possible connections to Moscow. Trump’s radical shift in US foreign policy – which not only abandons Ukraine but also exposes other European nations to potential Russian aggression – has only fuelled such speculation.

A third explanation is that Trump is pursuing tangible commercial benefits. His administration’s brief push for a rare earths deal with Ukraine suggests a transactional approach to foreign policy. In contrast, neither Bosnia nor Georgia possesses significant natural resources, nor do they match Hungary or Romania in terms of economic strength within the Emerging Europe region.

Backing Dodik would create the risk of another Balkan war, a messy and potentially very bloody scenario that would benefit no one. In business terms, that would complicate interests linked to Trump’s inner circle. His son-in-law Jared Kushner, through his investment firm Affinity Partners, has been exploring major real estate ventures in both Serbia and Albania – a development that would be jeopardised by renewed regional instability. What Trump's fans in Bosnia or Georgia have to offer is simply not enough to tempt the US president to back them.