The fractures in Russia-Azerbaijan relations are widening, exacerbated by the fallout from the downing of an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft and subsequent diplomatic disputes. The latest concerns an Azerbaijani ban on Nikolay Valuev, a senior lawmaker in Russia’s ruling United Russia party. 

Moscow’s reaction to the plane's downing has evolved from silence to outright denial and, ultimately, to deflection, as the Kremlin refrains from accepting responsibility for what Azerbaijani officials assert was a Russian missile strike on the aircraft over Chechnya. Despite President Vladimir Putin’s formal apology to President Ilham Aliyev, Russian media and political circles have intensified a smear campaign against Azerbaijan.

One of the most visible consequences of deteriorating relations has been the increased pressure on Azerbaijanis living in Russia. Moscow’s crackdown on migrants, while framed as a general tightening of immigration rules, has disproportionately affected Azerbaijanis. Russian Telegram channels and state-aligned media have amplified xenophobic narratives, portraying Azerbaijanis as the primary migrant group in the country. Some reports indicate that even Russian citizens of Azerbaijani origin have been subjected to scrutiny, feeding suspicions that migration policies are being weaponised in response to diplomatic tensions.

The anti-Azerbaijani campaign has extended to the Russian State Duma. Valuev recently made derogatory remarks about Azerbaijan, prompting Baku to declare him persona non grata. Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry condemned his statements as “unacceptable”. His ban follows similar measures against other Russian lawmakers, including Konstantin Zatulin and Vitaly Milonov, for their activities against Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.

Valuev, in response, expressed indifference to the ban, remarking that he had no intention of visiting Azerbaijan. However, his comments on Azerbaijan’s influence in Russia — specifically targeting Azerbaijani diaspora groups as centres of “power, influence and crime” — align with a broader anti-Azerbaijani discourse emerging in Russian nationalist circles.

Tensions reached new heights when Azerbaijan shut down the Russian House (Rossotrudnichestvo) Russian cultural centre in Baku, citing its lack of legal registration. Pro-government Azerbaijani analysts have pointed out that while the centre was ostensibly focused on cultural and humanitarian ties, it had also become a platform for Russian influence operations. Reports have linked Rossotrudnichestvo facilities in various countries to intelligence activities, with similar institutions closed across Europe after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The opposition, however, sees recent sabre-rattling as disingenuous. According to them, the Russian House being located just next to the Government House, it couldn't have suddenly been found to be an espionage centre.

Following the centre’s closure, Russian media intensified its criticism of Azerbaijan, with some lawmakers calling for retaliatory measures. Unverified reports from Russian Telegram channels have suggested that Moscow is considering economic and diplomatic countermeasures, including restrictions on remittances from Azerbaijani workers in Russia and potential trade disruptions.

Among the purported options on the table for Russia is the suspension of Azerbaijani oil exports through the Novorossiysk pipeline — a move that would primarily hurt Baku’s revenues. However, Azerbaijan has alternative export routes, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku-Supsa pipeline, limiting the effectiveness of such a measure according to the claims of pro-government outlets.

More alarmingly for Azerbaijan, some Russian sources have hinted at revisiting long-dormant separatist issues in Azerbaijan, particularly concerning the Lezgi minority. According to Azerbaijani media, which often speaks as a quasi-official government media organ, this echoes past Russian strategies of leveraging ethnic grievances as geopolitical tools, a pattern seen in Moscow’s historical support for Armenian separatists in Karabakh. Any overt encouragement of separatism would mark a dangerous escalation, potentially destabilising the North Caucasus region itself, where Moscow has struggled to contain its own ethnic tensions.

Azerbaijan’s decisive steps — banning anti-Baku Russian lawmakers and shutting down Russian influence institutions — signal a shift in its approach to Moscow. While economic interdependence remains significant, Baku is asserting its sovereignty more forcefully, even at the risk of Russian economic pressure. According to Azerbaijani expectations, Moscow, facing a deteriorating war in Ukraine and tightening Western sanctions, can ill afford to alienate another regional partner. However, the Kremlin’s long-standing imperial mindset leaves little room for equal partnerships. If Russia chooses escalation — through economic measures or covert destabilisation efforts — it risks further isolating itself in the region.