India's foreign policy since independence from Britain has been guided by pragmatism, balancing idealism with realpolitik. In the volatile geopolitics of South Asia where it is surrounded by adversaries such as Pakistan on the West and China on the East, maintaining engagement with both the Taliban in Afghanistan and the military junta in Myanmar is not just strategic but essential for India’s national security interests.

These ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ dynamics, while fraught with challenges, offer New Delhi the opportunity to secure its regional influence, contain cross border threats, and protect its economic and strategic assets.

Afghanistan: securing the north-west

The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 marked a seismic shift in the region’s security landscape. India’s longstanding alliance with the previous US-supported Afghan government crumbled overnight, eliminating a crucial buffer against anti-India islamist terrorist networks.

The withdrawal of US forces also removed an additional layer of security, exposing India to heightened transnational risks ranging from narcotics smuggling, human trafficking and militancy emanating from Afghan territory. 

In the aftermath of the US withdrawal, Beijing has sought to integrate Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), eyeing its vast mineral resources - especially critical minerals consequential to battery and semiconductor manufacturing supply chains. Islamabad has attempted to reassert its influence over the Taliban too, but the government and military establishment of Pakistan is equally threatened by the Taliban, factions which see Islamabad’s state authorities as enemies too.

In this chaos any protectionist attitude or obliviousness on India’s part would mean ceding strategic space to its adversaries, making constructive engagement a necessity. This is not to say that the Taliban doesn’t gain anything from engagement with New Delhi. As the regime is still considered a terrorist network in most of the world, cooperation with India could also soften attitudes elsewhere.

Furthermore, the Taliban also likely sees India as a counterweight to balance both Pakistan and China’s influence as well, and thus even talks with New Delhi are tantamount to hedging its bets against overdependence on any parties or camps.

While mutual diplomatic presence between New Delhi and Kabul remains based on unofficial arrangements without publicly known protocols since 2021, things have started to shift towards official engagement. 

To this end, a significant breakthrough came in January 2025, when India's Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, met with the Taliban's acting Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, marking an undeniably public display of engagement between the two sides.

Myanmar: securing the eastern flank

If Afghanistan represents India's northwestern security dilemma, Myanmar is its eastern lynchpin. The military coup in February 2021 derailed Myanmar’s democratic transition, raising ethical and diplomatic challenges for India. 

However, the junta’s rule remains a reality, and New Delhi cannot afford to isolate it at the risk of ceding influence to China - a country New Delhi is forced to engage with as both its biggest strategic challenge as well as its biggest trade partner.

China has aggressively expanded its footprint in Myanmar, supplying the Myanmar military with arms and deepening economic dependencies through infrastructure projects like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Beijing’s engagement, however, extends beyond the junta—it has also maintained ties with ethnic armed groups, leveraging them to safeguard its investments. For India as a state, neighbouring Myanmar is an all-important critical piece of its "Act East" policy and also a strategic gateway to Southeast Asia.

More pressingly, Myanmar’s stability directly impacts India’s northeastern states. The military junta has allegedly forged ties with insurgent groups in the region that are threats to India, potentially using them as leverage - however this leverage if abused also carries the risk of becoming the reason for a downturn in bilateral relations with New Delhi.