Turkey on March 19 was cast into an undeclared state of emergency following the detention during an early-morning police raid of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu at his home.

The detention of Imamoglu – days ahead of a planned party nomination as a presidential candidate who would be widely seen as having a good chance of toppling president of 22 years Recep Tayyip Erdogan – was carried out on the order of Istanbul chief prosecutor Akin Gurlek, Gurlek’s office said in a press release.

Access to social media is currently restricted in Turkey. The Istanbul governorate, meanwhile, has suspended main metro lines and main boulevards. It has also banned any kind of street demonstrations until March 23.

On the markets, the USD/Turkish lira (TRY) rate hit the 42s from the 36s before retreating to the 38s. At the worst stage it was down over 14%. Circuit breakers were activated at Borsa Istanbul. Nevertheless, the benchmark BIST-100 was down 7% d/d.

Finance minister Mehmet Simsek said in a tweet that the markets were under control. An unnamed central bank official told Bloomberg that the authority sold about $8-9bn via public banks to stop the lira's slide.

No challenge expected

Istanbul Blog writes: On past experience, the few media outlets in Turkey that still back Imamoglu’s party, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), will kick up a fuss for a few days and some tweets will fly back and forth.

However, there is no visible sign that a real challenge to the rule of Erdogan is any longer possible in the country. Whenever a few protesting Turks come together on the street, the police quickly swoop and take them away.

Also, little external pressure is expected. Some loud but ultimately feeble voices in Europe will no doubt raise some concern.

If you are wondering whether the EU is genuinely concerned, an X account entitled “Is EU Concerned?” (@ISEUConcerned) closely follows the EU’s emotional state. It provides details on whether the EU is “very, deeply, strongly, seriously, gravely, extremely or unprecedentedly” concerned.

Law? What law?

For those who’ve never tried to get to grips with Turkey till now, let’s perhaps confirm we’re talking about the country, not the bird, and stress that the detention of the mayor has nothing to do with the law.

Each time there is a notable arrest, or the seizure of a municipality or sizeable company, the media circulate some reasoning put out by officials, but in the final analysis, all such moves are quite obviously political and can be directly laid at Erdogan’s door.

On March 14, bne IntelliNews noted: “In 2024, Akin Gurlek was appointed as chief public prosecutor in Istanbul. Journalists, who claim that Gurlek’s job is to conduct operations against Imamoglu, currently seen as a politician that could one day succeed Erdogan, are arrested.”

The diploma comedy

The day before the raid and detention, on March 18, Istanbul University revoked Imamoglu’s bachelor degree, thereby invalidating any presidential candidacy he might declare.

The funny thing about the move to strip Imamoglu of his diploma is that Erdogan does not have one. Our dear leader graduated from a three-year vocational school. Such a graduation is not sufficient for a presidential candidate. The constitutional law requires a four-year undergraduate diploma.

For those who can still say more about the bird than the country, let's add another little explainer here. In Turkey, there is de facto no law in effect whatsoever, constitutional or otherwise.

But never mind, with the diploma move, Erdogan blocked Imamoglu’s planned candidacy. Imamoglu could make as much noise as he wished. However, at the end of the day, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) would reject his application, outlining a non-fulfilment of constitutionally required pre-conditions.

Which begs the question. Why was the voiding of the diploma not enough? Is Erdogan so much afraid of seeing Imamoglu in the political arena, or is he exhibiting just how powerful he is?

No surprise

Since the last local elections, held in March 2024, 12 municipalities have been seized by the government. Ten were held by the main Kurdish party DEM, while two were held by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

(See the full list here.)

The government has also arrested the CHP mayors of Besiktas and Beykoz districts in Istanbul. However, in relation to the arrests, it did not seize the municipalities concerned.

The district parliament in Besiktas elected a new mayor in line with Turkish laws. The Beykoz mayor was dismissed on March 4, but the interior ministry has not appointed a trustee. It looks like the Besiktas model will be followed there.

In the new local government cycle, it is the seizing of CHP municipalities that has emerged as a new phenomenon.

Since January, bne IntelliNews has been parroting that the real target in all of this is Imamoglu. And since February, this publication has been posing the question: “Will Erdogan jail Imamoglu?”

Elections?

The next presidential election in Turkey is not due until 2028, but Erdogan could use the device of calling a snap election in order to secure the additional term of office that the rules say he is not entitled to if he sticks to the electoral calendar.

When it comes to polls in Turkey, of course, it has to be noted that we are not talking about normal elections.

In a normal election, it is expected that the outcome will be identical to the ballot box votes cast. There is no rigging. The votes that are counted are counted without thievery.

“Competitive authoritarianism”

Turkey’s regime refrains from claiming massive “80%” victories in elections (something Russia's Putin regime is known for) since Ankara is dependent on external borrowing. It cannot escape its constant requirement to source crates of dollars.

Thus the Erdogan henchmen stage some theatre (the observer, for instance, can expect a “49%” victory in the first presidential voting round and a “52%” triumph in the second round) that, from space, can be said to resemble “competitive authoritarianism”.

His Majesty’s Opposition

The state of the opposition within Turkey remains farcical. It should be reiterated that there is no place in this political theatre for anyone that poses a real threat to the regime (for instance, “star” prisoners Selahattin Demirtas and Osman Kavala).

If a UK allegory is employed for the sake of truly describing the so-called opposition in Turkey, it could be said that it amounts to “His Majesty’s Opposition”, and we all know who His Majesty is here; it is not a true opposition that serves the republic.

Again, when observed from space, it appears that there is an opposition within the political system of the country. But when seen from the ground, it is not the case in reality.

Limited value of local elections

Local elections in Turkey also serve to create an appearance that appears to reflect some real political “competition” in the country.

Yet Turkey is a seriously unitary state. It has been governed from Ankara for about a century and by a single man since 2017, when the Turks said “Yes” in a constitutional referendum that did away with the parliamentary republic and invested any power worth having in the “executive president”.

Local municipalities in Turkey collect rubbish, operate water utilities and attend to other commonplace stuff. They are important in that they distribute the building permits (i.e. they decide who will make the money to be had from construction projects) and run tenders (i.e. they decide who will grow rich from their spending).

Stubborn Imamoglu wins, and wins again

Given Imamoglu's current woes, a recap of a key moment in his ascent is in order. On the election evening of the March 2019 local polls, the regime, as per usual, announced that its candidate had won the Istanbul contest.

To then, under normal conditions, the CHP candidate was expected to turn tail and serve as the "notary" who confirms the election result released by the regime, providing legitimacy.

Imamoglu, however, refused to give in and in the end managed to secure the mayorship. In a rerun demanded by Erdogan and his henchmen, Imamoglu won an even more resounding victory that could not be denied. This is the reason why Erdogan does not want to see him as his rival.

What now?

The CHP was set to announce Imamoglu as its candidate for the presidency on March 23.

Such a declaration might not be too meaningful now.

With the possibility that Erdogan could at any time call for a snap election, an early announcement of Imamoglu’s candidacy was supposed to aim at seizing the initiative.

After the dust settles over the plight of Imamoglu, all eyes will turn to Ankara's CHP mayor Mansur Yavas (@mansuryavas06). Yavas, who might now win the candidacy, tweeted on March 18 in support of Imamoglu against the diploma ruling. He tweeted again, on March 19, to protest against the detention of Imamoglu.

In 2014, Yavas won the local election race in Ankara. Soon after it became clear that he won, the regime announced that he had lost. Yavas surrendered and went home. Will Erdogan be okay with Yavas as his rival, or will he eliminate him too?