Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stressed on February 27 that in Ankara’s eyes, Turkey cannot be excluded from possible future European defence structures.

His comments came as European members of Nato continued to weigh up the possibility that under Donald Trump, the US might not remain committed to the defence bloc and its Article 5 provision that says Nato parties agree that an attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. It also came as American and Russian officials met in Istanbul to continue with efforts at restoring full relations between Washington and Moscow.

“If European security architecture will regenerate, it is, of course, not possible without Turkey. In other words, leaving Turkey out of a security architecture approach would be unrealistic. This matter should be underlined," said Fidan.

In mid-January, bne IntelliNews, on the eve of Trump’s inauguration for a second term of office, reported on an assessment by Chatham House senior consulting fellow Galip Dalay that, with Trump’s commitment to Nato questionable, the EU cannot hope to deter Russia from future hostilities effectively without closer cooperation with Turkey, which, after the US, has the second largest land forces in Nato.

“With Donald Trump’s forthcoming inauguration, the question of the future of the European security order has become more pressing – and so has the need for clarity about Turkey’s place and role within that order. In this respect, Trump’s return might provide much needed impetus for the European Union and Turkey to finally engage in more serious dialogues on European security and on broader foreign and security policy cooperation,” wrote Dalay, who consults for the Turkey Initiative, Middle East and North Africa Programme at the British think tank, otherwise known as the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

In return for higher commitments to defence and security in Europe, it is likely Turkey would push for its application to join the European Union, which is de facto frozen, to be unfrozen and advanced.

On February 24, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke of his country's military power. He also referred to its potential to strengthen the security of Europe and about how the realisation of Turkey’s long-held ambition to join the EU would benefit all sides.

“Only Turkey’s full membership in the bloc can save the European Union from the impasse it has fallen into, from economy to defence, from politics to international reputation,” Erdogan said after a cabinet meeting.

Also on February 27, Bloomberg reported that Turkey is open to providing troops for a peacekeeping force in Ukraine, citing people familiar with the matter.

On February 24, Karol Wasilewski at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), wrote that although Turkey anticipates an end to the conflict in Ukraine, it does not consider a resolution achieved solely through US–Russia negotiations to be in its interests.

This position, he added, was driven by three factors.

“The first,” said Wasilewski, “is the belief among Turkish policymakers that lasting conflict resolutions require the consideration of the security interests of regional actors, rather than an agreement imposed by great powers without their involvement.”

“The second factor,” added the analyst, “concerns Ankara’s intentions regarding Ukraine, which not only presents economic opportunities through post-war reconstruction but also plays a significant role in Turkey’s plans to expand its defence sector (for instance, as a supplier of engines for the Akinci and Kizilelma UAVs [unmanned aerieal vehicles, or drones] and as a potential co-producer for the Kaan fighter jet).”

“The third factor,” concluded Wasilewski, “relates to concerns that such a resolution could embolden Russia. The Turkish leadership appears deeply concerned about Trump’s excessively conciliatory stance towards Moscow. If this were to result in the recognition of Russian territorial gains in Ukraine, it would enable the Russian Federation to rebuild its military capabilities more rapidly, ultimately shifting the balance of power in the Black Sea in its favour.

“Furthermore, Ankara would like to reap the benefits of its previous involvement in negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow – hence Erdogan’s proposal to host four-party talks in Turkey, reinforcing its role as a key mediator in the conflict.”