Amid the latest security realignments and efforts to strengthen its strategic interdependence, the EU must not overlook the potential volatility of the Western Balkans. Surrounded by EU member states, the region remains a powder keg that could ignite at any moment. Reinforcing its soft power and accelerating EU accession for the Western Balkan are pivotal strategies for ensuring long-term security across the region and whole continent.

The global order is changing, and military and defence rhetoric is making a comeback in Europe, highlighted by the EU's efforts to strengthen Europe's defence capabilities through the Readiness 2030 Plan, formerly referred to as the ReArm Europe Plan. 

Previously, Nato's secretary general urged the alliance to adopt a "wartime mindset" in order to respond to evolving security challenges, emphasising the need for increased defence investment and readiness. At the same time, the likely next German chancellor questioned Nato’s current structure, urging Europe to build more independent defence capabilities. Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron called for European rearmament and raised the possibility of using France's nuclear deterrent to protect the continent.

The resurgence of this military and defence rhetoric in Europe can be attributed to several interconnected factors from changing security threats and geopolitical shifts, to uncertainty in the existing military alliance of Nato. However, the war in Ukraine is arguably playing a crucial role, as it became a catalyst for rethinking security, especially due to its proximity to the EU.

In this context, we shouldn’t forget how the Western Balkans, a region surrounded by EU members on all sides, is often described as a powder keg waiting to be activated at any moment. That rings true. For years, there have been potential ethnic conflicts in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, and to a lesser extent North Macedonia.  

In particular, the recent spark of separatist rhetoric in Bosnia has been fuelled by escalating political tensions, further undermining the country’s state authority, and any instability within the region could quickly spread in the other countries.

All six Western Balkan countries have formally expressed interest in EU membership. For much of the past decades, the EU played a key role in the region, using the promise of membership as leverage to encourage reforms and reconciliation. This strategy of conditionality: fulfilling certain reforms and conditions linked to the benefits of accession, impacted regional stability and democracy, practically intertwining them with the reform processes. This makes leaving the Western Balkans outside the EU path a complicated and potentially dangerous venture which might cost security. The deep economic, cultural, and trade ties, and interconnectedness with Europe make any regional instability a threat to the EU too. 

European integration can still be the motor for stability and reconciliation. The problem is, at its current pace and in the changing geopolitical climate, it is too slow. While the EU formally reaffirms the commitment to enlargement, the reality on the ground is enlargement fatigue marked by delays and frustration. Greater focus is needed, which should be decisive and fast, not mostly rhetorical and demagogic.

The bilateral agreement between North Macedonia and Greece ending a decades-long dispute is the most notable case. After becoming a potential example for others in the region, instead of moving forward, the discouraging further delays in the accession of North Macedonia are sending a negative message across the region. If a country which made painful compromises and fulfilled EU demands continues to face obstacles, other aspiring members may question whether compromises and reform efforts are truly rewarded.

The accession process involves numerous criteria the Western Balkans has to meet, and the countries must continue putting efforts into advancing reforms. However, if the EU cannot deliver progress in accession, it risks undermining the incentive for countries to continue reforming. The EU must strengthen its soft power and conditionality with credibility. While reforms should remain a prerequisite, the EU must show that fulfilling conditions leads to tangible progress, not endless delays.

A key obstacle slowing down the enlargement process is member states' hesitation, waiting for reforms before expanding. This should not be the case. Both processes for EU reforms and enlargement go together. In fact, simultaneous progress on both fronts could accelerate reforms, with enlargement serving as a catalyst for reaching consensus on critical issues. Currently, disagreements over matters like veto rights remain a significant point of contention likely to persist in the near future. If these unresolved issues continue to block progress, they could indefinitely delay enlargement.

All of this inevitably leads to fast-track accession for the Western Balkans countries. Other countries in the region have also been slowly moving forward for many years, while at the same time the EU wants to accelerate the accession of the Eastern Partnership countries. This push for enlargement gained momentum after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, yet hesitation within the EU remained contradictory. Skeptics must recognise the EU’s stability is inherently tied to that of the Western Balkans, making enlargement in the region, as well as in Ukraine, a strategic necessity. Therefore, the EU must find a way to expedite the integration of the Western Balkans, before new candidates, as all are driven by same security-related concern.

The Western Balkans cannot afford to be left in limbo much longer. If the EU fails to act with fast and feasible accession, it risks democratic backsliding, rising nationalism, or simply geopolitical rivals filling the vacuum. The EU must move beyond rhetoric and fulfill its commitments, while the Western Balkans countries must swiftly implement reforms.

The vicinity of the Western Balkans, as a region with a history of ethnic tensions, separatist rhetoric, and foreign influence, represent a potential flashpoint which could destabilise the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. It’s in the EU’s interest to prevent such an instability in its backyard, where at the same time there are most of the potential new member states which in the future might be part of the EU.

Bojan Lazarevski is a political scientist in international and intercultural studies based in North Macedonia. Bojan is also a policy fellow with Young Voices Europe, an activist and a researcher.