In the changing world order, Kazakhstan continues to pursue the multi-vector foreign policy that has served it well for the last three decades. But while Astana balances its relations with Russia, China and the West, emerging mid-level powers such as the Gulf states and South Korea may become more desirable partners to help develop its economy than countries that continue to see the world’s largest landlocked country through a post-colonial lens.

In terms of natural resources, Kazakhstan has a huge amount to offer. It had the 12th highest global daily oil production in 2023, according to the 2024 Statistical Review of World Energy published by the Energy Institute, while proven oil reserves stood at 30bn barrels as of January 2025, data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) showed. In the former Soviet region it has the third largest gas reserves after Russia and Turkmenistan and is an important producer and exporter of natural gas. Beyond hydrocarbons, it has large deposits of coal, and in-demand metals such as uranium, copper, lead and zinc as well as rare earth metals (REMs) that have become crucial for the green transition. 

All this makes it a very attractive partner in a way that goes beyond its strategic position. Still, Kazakhstan's large territory and geographic location at the heart of Eurasia, with long borders with both Russia and China, are also significant. That gives the country two major world powers on its doorstep  –  one that previously ruled Kazakhstan and sees it as very much part of its sphere of influence; the other that has become increasingly powerful on the global stage as well as hungry for the fossil fuels, metals and wheat Kazakhstan produces. 

Of all the countries in the former Soviet space, Kazakhstan was arguably the most closely entwined with Russia. Rather than breaking away from the dying Soviet Union, the Kazakh SSR was kicked out when Boris Yeltsin and the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine decided to dissolve the union. Its new leaders took charge of a country where less than half of the population was ethnically Kazakh (that has since risen to over 70%), and where the northern regions had large Russian populations and were for the most part culturally Russian too. 

That gave newly independent Kazakhstan a tricky relationship to manage with its weakened but potentially dangerous northern neighbour Russia at the beginning of the 1990s. It led to the new country’s multi-vector foreign policy, carefully balancing relationships with major global powers while maintaining its sovereignty. This approach, first shaped under the leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev, has been continued under his successor, current President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. 

Balancing relations with Russia, China, the Western powers and – increasingly – with emerging powers in Asia and the Middle East remains Kazakhstan’s external strategy, and one it has continued to pursue through the current geopolitical turmoil, even as new rifts open up between former partners and new international allegiances are forged. 

Neighbours at war 

Russia’s annexation of parts of Ukrainian territory since 2014 and its full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022 sent a clear message to other states in the former Soviet Union that Moscow would not hesitate to take what territory it wanted and blatantly break international law to invade countries in what it considers its sphere of influence. 

Reinforcing this message to Kazakhstan specifically, sporadic threats have been thrown out by Russian nationalists and quasi-official figures about the Russian nature of north Kazakhstan. Within the country, Kazakhstani law enforcement has come down heavily on pro-Russian separatists. 

These appear to be idle threats aimed at keeping a useful partner in line. There is no particular reason for Russia to invade Kazakhstan, which has good relations with Moscow and most importantly, unlike Ukraine, has never mooted the idea of joining Nato.

Thus for Kazakhstan, the war in Ukraine has been seen as both a challenge and an opportunity, Marcin Popławski, senior specialist in the Turkey, Caucasus and Central Asia team at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), said in an interview with bne IntelliNews, with the country conducting its foreign policy “like a boxer who has mastered the art of dodging”. 

“Kazakhstan’s goals at the beginning of the war were to strengthen its sovereignty and statehood, to obtain the greatest possible benefits and not allow itself to be dominated by Russia or China,” Popławski said. 

The country, like others in Central Asia and the Caucasus, has benefited economically from international sanctions on Russia. Despite pledging to adhere to Western sanctions, there have been numerous reports of sanctions busting by Kazakhstani companies, while dual-use imports have also been reportedly been sent via Kazakhstan to Russia. 

At the same time, according to Popławski, Kazakhstan is a perfect example of a state that has become politically stronger since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. “The goal of Kazakhstan’s diplomacy after the outbreak of war was to securitise the state. As part of this, Astana obtained strong support from China in 2022,” he told bne IntelliNews, referencing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Astana in September 2022. During that visit Xi explicitly said China would "continue to resolutely support Kazakhstan in protecting its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity". 

Astana resisted pressure from Russia to formally support it in its war against Ukraine – even though Moscow came to Tokayev’s aid earlier in 2022 when troops from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) were dispatched to quell the ‘bloody January’ unrest in Kazakhstan. In an embarrassing moment for Moscow, Tokayev publicly refused to recognise the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) in Ukraine as independent republics. 

Kazakhstan also rejected an invitation – mainly pushed by Russia – to join the BRICS bloc of emerging markets. “[T]hey [Kazakhstan] don’t want to be associated so strongly with the Global South,” said Popławski.

Trading partners

The need for Kazakhstan to keep its options open both trade-wise and geopolitically is confirmed by its top trading partners. As of January 2025 (the latest data available), Italy topped the list of the top five export partners, accounting for 28.1% of the total, alongside fellow EU member France (5.4%). Kazakhstan’s three other main export destinations were China (14.7%), Russia (9.8%) and Turkey (5.3%). 

The country’s three largest oilfields are controlled by consortia in which US and other Western companies have majority stakes and 80% of the oil processed is sent west through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) – whose shareholders include Russia’s Transneft and Lukoil, Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGas and US Chevron and Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company (MCPC). 

“This picture shows Kazakhstan through the lens of how [the] country has pursued its foreign policy in order not to alienate its partners in the EU and US, [yet] traditionally include Russia as a political reference point,” said Popławski. 

“Diversification of economic partners will remain a government priority in order to minimise over-dependence on China and Russia,” Mario Bikarski, Europe and Central Asia Analyst at risk intelligence company Verisk Maplecroft, told bne IntelliNews. 

Bikarski argues that “Kazakhstan will maintain strong investment partnerships with European countries and the EU is likely to remain the largest source of inbound [foreign direct investment] FDI into the country. Kazakhstan has also been deepening ties with Gulf countries and Turkey. It will continue [to] leverage its critical geographic position via participation in North-South and East-West trade corridors.”

However, Bikarski adds, “Kazakhstan’s foreign policy goals remain constrained by its geography and large reliance on imports from both China and Russia.”

Beyond hydrocarbons 

Kazakhstan’s importance as a trading and investment partner increasingly goes beyond oil and gas, especially given the growing demand for materials needed for the green transition. 

“Kazakhstan has the world’s ninth largest geography. It is the largest landlocked country, endowed with basically everything in the periodic table and in vast quantities so it is economical to take them out as well … From a geopolitical point of view, the importance of access to critical raw materials is increasing,” Hüseyin Özhan, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) managing director for Central Asia, said in an interview with bne IntelliNews in February. Özhan described the “vast spectrum of potential investments” in the country.

As pointed out by Sultan Zhumagali, head of the analytics and research department at Almaty-based BCC Invest, the country has significant reserves of rare earth metals (REMs) as well as uranium, lithium and other metals needed for high-tech applications such as batteries, semiconductors and renewable energy generation. 

This has led to an increase in cooperation with the EU and US in recent years. A strategic partnership in the field of raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen between Kazakhstan and the EU came into effect in 2023. This, explained Zhumagali, “aims to attract investments, facilitate technology transfers and integrate Kazakhstani mining into global supply chains”. The US is also interested in developing ties with Kazakhstan and neighbouring Uzbekistan with an eye to its REMs. 

“Kazakhstan is enhancing its position as a key player in the global raw materials market, leading in uranium production and strategic metals, and emerging as a supplier of rare earth elements,” said Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) head of research Evgney Vinokurov in an interview with bne IntelliNews. 

Kazakhstan is a major player in the global uranium market, supplying China, the EU and the US. It is one of the top 10 global copper producers as well as a major holder of metals such as tungsten. It is expanding rare earth mining, particularly for neodymium, dysprosium and terbium, which are used in electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines and electronics. A discovery in March 2024 revealed a high-grade lithium deposit valued at $15.7bn. In February, Kazakhstan opened its rare earth and rare metal deposits to international competition, inviting companies from the US, the EU and China to bid for mining rights at government-held auctions. 

Diverse investment sources 

Kazakhstan is already seeing a diversification in sources of FDI. EDB research shoes that while Kazakhstan has a substantial stock of FDI from China, its FDI stock from the Gulf countries (chiefly the UAE and Qatar) has soared to $3.1bn. “The GCC countries gained a serious foothold in Central Asia,” said Vinokurov.  

There has also been a diversification in its exports. While exports remain resource-driven, Vinokurov pointed out that the share of fuel and energy goods in Kazakhstan’s foreign trade has decreased from 76.4% in 2014 to 57% today which, he says, is “signalling a gradual shift from oil dependence and reinforcing the need for further economic diversification”.

 Astana’s ability to maintain good relations with multiple partners is being tested as Kazakhstan prepares to build its first nuclear power plant (NPP) to meet rising demand for electricity as both its population and industrial sector grow fast.

“The Kazakh government is looking to attract an international consortium of firms for its first nuclear power plant, as a hedge against an over-reliance on any single partner,” said Bikarski. Among those seeking to secure the contract to build the power plant are companies from China, France, Russia and South Korea. However, Bikarski says, “Russia’s dominance in uranium enrichment capacity means Kazakhstan will need to maintain close co-operation with Rosatom.” 

Not just a resource supplier 

Kazakhstan has been working for years to diversify its economy away from simply being a supplier of natural resources. That means it has to some extent to diversify away from its traditional partners such as the Western countries, that mainly see it from that perspective. 

“The West is becoming less and less attractive because it doesn’t meet the needs of Kazakhstan. The West is primarily interested in simple exploitation and purchasing of resources. Kazakhstan wants to change the structure of the economy … it is looking for added value and know-how, not a neo-colonial approach,” said Popławski. 

Of course, Kazakhstan isn’t about to give up hydrocarbon exports, given their importance for the economy. However, says Popławski, “They [Kazakhstan] find China, the Gulf countries, South Korea and Japan attractive as examples of modernisers and investors.” 

Chinese companies are among those that have diversified their investments “[I]nvestment projects with Chinese capital in recent years have become more broad-based across the economy in sectors such as chemical processing, manufacturing, construction and retail,” said Bikarski. 

By contrast, the main investors from the West are focusing on the oil and gas sector and other extractive industries. 

Among the winners

As the geopolitical landscape continues to change dramatically since Donald Trump returned to power in the US, thanks to its multi-vector position, Kazakhstan is seen as one of the winners not just from the changes over the past few years but most likely from future changes too. 

Even before Trump’s return, geopolitical tensions contributed to a sharp decline in trade and FDI between rival blocs led by the United States on the one hand and China and Russia on the other. Yet there have been some clear winners from the fragmentation in global trading blocs. These economies dubbed “connector” economies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have benefited by maintaining positive relations with multiple powers, seeing surges in FDI as a result. A recent EBRD report puts the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan among these economies, alongside countries such as Mexico, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Vietnam. 

“The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are getting FDI from everywhere – from the US, from the West, from China, from non-aligned countries. These three countries accounted for 10% of greenfield FDI projects last year,” said the EBRD’s chief economist Beata Javorcik in a recent interview with bne IntelliNews. “Two countries in our portfolio are also seeing an uptick: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,” she added. 

While global powers reorganise into new blocs, Astana continues to position itself as an indispensable partner to both East and West – but it is the links with emerging powers that align most closely with its ambitions to diversify its economy that may become the most valuable.